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In the present work, we propose a coopetitive model applied to the Greek crisis, which
aims both at improving the competitiveness of the Greek productive system and rebalancing
the current account balance of the country. Our model of coopetition (based on normal
form game theory) is conceived at a macro level, wherein there are two players: Greece and
SNC (the Surplus Northern Countries of the euro area). We suggest a model that looks for
a win-win solution. The win-win solution entails a cooperative bi-strategy in which SNC
should contribute to re-balance its trade surplus with respect to Greece and, in addition,
SNC should provide a certain amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) to improve the
competitiveness and the growth in Greece. Thus we find a transferable utility and properly
coopetitive solution, convenient for all the players.
Keywords. Games and economics; competition; cooperation; coopetition
1 Introduction
How can we help Greece to find solutions to overcome or, at least, improve its economy which is
still suffering from a deep crisis since 2010? Which kind of policy actions can be taken within the
euro system to make the Greek economy more competitive and steer the country towards a path
of sustainable economic growth? The austerity measures imposed by the European authorities
and the IMF to Greece revealed their limits, determining a long and deep recession and making
the recovery very problematic, as Mussa (2010) had already foreseen. In the present work
we propose a coopetitive model applied to the Greek crisis, which aims both at rebalancing the
current account balance of the country and make the Greek productive system more competitive.
So, we propose a model that looks for a win-win solution. This model, based on normal form
game theory and conceived at a macro level, aims at suggesting feasible solutions in a coopetitive
perspective for the divergent interests, which drive the economic policies of the countries in the
euro area. In the model we consider only two players: Greece and the Northern Countries of
the euro area in surplus (SNC), namely: Germany, Austria, France, Finland, Netherlands and
Luxembourg. In fact, since 2008, these latter countries have become much more competitive
than the Southern countries of the euro area (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy), thus these
Northern countries have obtained large current account surpluses. In our model the win-win
solution entails that SNC should contribute to re-balance its trade surplus with respect to Greece.
In addition SNC should provide a certain amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) that can
improve the competitiveness of Greek economy, FDI may also become an important part of a
new strategy of growth in Greece because of its spillover effects. This economic policy strategy
based on coopetition pursued by SNC and Greece is convenient for both since it will help to make
the euro area a financially stable region; in addition the improved competitiveness of Greece will
favor its growth and this will benefit SNC as well. We are indeed aware that this model is built
on some special assumptions, though not unrealistic, so our analytical framework of coopetition
represents a partial and possible way out of the economic crisis that hits the Greek economy.
2 Greece, its crisis and the strategy based on coopetition.
Greece is still suffering a deep and lasting economic crisis. The rates of changes of its real GDP
in the last three years, 2011, 2012, 2013, have been heavily negative, respectively -7.1 per cent,
-6.4 per cent, - 4.2 per cent (Eurostat, 2013). All this demonstrates that the austerity policies
imposed by the European authorities and the IMF have produced a severe and lasting downturn
in the economy (Cline, 2013). So the only desiderable and correct solution for Greece is to
favour its growth (De Grauwe, 2013, Schiliro`, 2013). Carf and Schilir have already suggested
a strategy based on coopetition to find feasible solutions to overcome the Greek crisis (Carf,
Schilir, 2011). Like in the other coopetitive models we have developed (Carfi, Schiliro` 2011,
Carfi, Schiliro`, 2012), also in the present model we provide a coopetitive win-win solution, a
situation in which each agent (the Greece, on one side, and the SNC, on the other) cooperate
and compete at the same time, taking into account the divergent interests of the two sides, and in
which both sides gain. In this paper, more specifically, we propose a coopetitive model where the
coopetitive (shared) variables are the exports of goods and services from Greece to SNC of the
euro area in surplus (SNC) and the FDI from SNC to Greece. Regarding the exports of Greece
towards SNC, this strategy can alleviate the trade deficit of the Greek economy. As far as the
latter variable (FDI), Greece, by receiving inward investment, will improve its competitiveness
and gain in terms of an increase in productive capacity, determined by a shift in the aggregate
supply. The Greek economy will also experience an increase in the aggregate demand, with
a greater production and the creation of new jobs. A very important effect of FDI is that
home producers in Greece will have access to the latest technology from abroad with positive
externalities on the production system; moreover there will be a positive effect on the countrys
capital account, since FDI represents an inflow (credit) on the capital account. Finally, there
will be less need to import because goods are produced in the domestic economy. All this will
concur to affect positively the competitiveness of the Greek economy, favoring the stability and
growth in Greece and, in turn, benefiting the whole euro area. The present model is based on
the notion of coopetition (Branderburger, Nalebuff, 1995, 1996; Bengtsson, Kock, 2000; Luo,
2007; Padula, Dagnino, 2007), it provides a game theory framework that offers a set of possible
solutions in a coopetitive context allowing us to find bargaining Pareto solutions in a win-win
scenario. We already devised a coopetitive model at a macroeconomic level in which we had
developed a coopetitive game by excluding the mutual influence of the actions (or strategies)
for the two players (Carfi, Schiliro`, 2011). This choice has allowed us to greatly simplify the
model, secondly it has highlighted the coopetitive aspect, although at the expense of the classical
feature of game theory. Later we developed other models (Carf, Schiliro`, 2012a, 2013) where
we have taken into account of this mutual influence, as in the present model we are going to
describe.
3 The coopetitive model
In this paper, we develop and apply the new mathematical model of a coopetitive game - intro-
duced in Game Theory for the first time by David Carf`ı and already adopted by David Carf`ı
and Schiliro` in [18, 19, 20, 21] in different contexts. The model introduced in this paper requires
technics and competences adopted and pointed out in [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] and, from a
algorithmic point of view, in [1, 15, 16, 17]. We desire to notice that, until now, the Branden-
burgher and Nalebuff idea of coopetitive game was used, in a mostly intuitive and non-formalized
way, in Strategic Management Studies. Let us begin with our basic assumptions.
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Assumption 1. Our first hypothesis is that SNC must stimulate the aggregate demand to
re-balance their trade surplus in favor of Greece. Moreover, we assume that - in agreement with
the Greek Government - they will invest in innovative and efficient technologies in Greece.
Assumption 2. The second hypothesis is that Greece, a country with a huge public debt,
unsustainable to deficit/GDP and low productivity is forced by external authorities to undertake
austerity measures and, since the country needs to get the equilibrium of its trade balance, it
agrees to increase its exports primarily towards SNC.
Assumption 3. The coopetitive model we propose hereunder must be interpreted as a
normative model, in the sense that:
• it imposes some clear and a priori conditions to be respected, by binding contracts, in order
to enlarge the possible outcomes of both countries;
• consequently, it shows appropriate win-win strategy solutions, chosen by considering both
competitive and cooperative behaviors, simultaneously;
• finally, it proposes appropriate fair divisions of the win-win payoff solutions.
Assumption 4. The strategy spaces of the model are:
• the strategy set of SNC, say E, set of all possible consumptions of SNC (in our model),
given in a conventional monetary unit.
• the strategy set of Greece F , set of all possible reductions of public expenses of Greece
(in our model), given in a conventional monetary unit (different from the above SNC monetary
unit);
• a shared strategy set C, whose elements are determined together by the two players, when
they determine their own respective strategy sets E and F , SNC and Greece. Every strategy
z in C is a pair (z1, z2) of monetary amounts: the first component z1 represents an amount -
given in a third conventional monetary unit - of Greek exports imported into SNC, by respecting
a binding contract; the second component z2 represents the amount of investments of SNC in
Greece, by respecting a binding ex-ante agreement.
Therefore, in the model, we assume that SNC and Greece define the set of coopetitive
strategies.
3.1 Strategy spaces and payoff functions
Assumption 5. In this model, we consider a linear affine mutual interaction between SNC and
Greece, adherent to the real state of the Euro-area. Specifically:
• we consider an interaction between the two players also at the level of their non-cooperative
strategies;
• we assume that Greece also should import (by contract) some SNC production.
Assumption 6. We assume that:
• any real number x, belonging to the interval E := [0, 3], represents a possible consumption
of SNC (given in an appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number y, in the same interval F := E, represents aggregate austerity measures
of Greece (given in another appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number z1, again in the interval C1 = [0, 2], represents any possible amount of
Greek exports which is imported by SNC (given in conventional monetary unit), by a binding
ex ante agreement;
• any real number z2, in the same interval C2 = [0, 2], represents a possible investment of
SNC (given in another appropriate conventional monetary unit).
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3.1.1 Payoff function of SNC
We assume that the payoff function of SNC, f1, is represented by its aggregate demand :
• f1 is equal to the consumption function C1 plus the investment function I1 plus government
spending (that we shall assume equal 2, constant in our interaction) plus export function X1
minus the import function M1, that is
f1 = 2 + C1 + I1 + X1 −M1.
We assume that:
• SNC’s consumption function C1 is the first projection of the strategic coopetitive space
S := E2 × C, that is defined by
C1(x, y, z) = x,
for every possible SNC consumption x in E; this because we assumed SNC’s consumption to be
the first strategic component of strategy profiles in S;
• the investment function I1 is constant on the space S, and by translation we can suppose
I1 equal zero;
• the export function X1 is defined by
X1(x, y, z) = −y/3− z2/2,
for every Greek possible austerity measure y and for every SNC possible investment y in inno-
vative technology in Greece; so we assume that the export function X1 is a strictly decreasing
function with respect to the individual Greek strategy and the second cooperative component
strategy;
• the import function M1 is the following partial projection of the strategic space, namely
M1(x, y, z) = z1,
for every cooperative strategy z1 ∈ 2U , because we assume the import function M1 depending
only upon the cooperative strategy z of the coopetitive game G, our third strategic component
of the strategy profiles in S.
Recap. We then assume as payoff function of SNC the aggregate demand f1, which in our
model is equal, at every triple (x, y, z) in the profile strategy set S, to the sum of the strategies
x, −z with the export function X1, viewed as a reaction function to the Greece investments (so
that f1 is the difference of the first and third projection of the strategy profile space S plus the
function export function X1).
Concluding, the payoff function of SNC is the function f1 of the set S into the real line R,
defined by
f1(x, y, z) = 2 + x− y/3− z1 − z2/2,
for every triple (x, y, z) in the space S; where the reaction function X1, defined from the space
S into the real line R by
X1(x, y, z) = −y/3− z2/2,
for every possible investment y of Greece in the interval 3U , is the export function of SNC
mapping the level y of Greece austerity measure and the level z2 of Northern investment in
Greece into the level X1(x, y, z) of Northern export.
3.1.2 Payoff function of Greece
We assume that the payoff function of Greece f2 is again its aggregate demand: consumption C2
plus investment I2 plus government spending (assumed to be 1) plus exports X2 minus imports
M2); so that
f2 = 1 + C2 + I2 + X2 −M2.
We assume that:
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• the function C2 is relevant in our analysis, since we assume the Greek consumptions depend
on the choice of the strategy austerity measure y; we assume
C2 = 1− y/3;
• the function I2 : S → R is defined by
I2(x, y, z) = z2 + nz1,
for every (x, y, z) in S;
• the export function X2 is the linear function defined by
X2(x, y, z) = z1 + mz2,
for every (x, y, z) in S (see above for the justification);
• the function M2 is relevant in our analysis, since we assume the import function, by
coopetitive contract with SNC, dependent on the choice of the triple (x, y, z) in S, specifically, we
assume the import function M2 defined on the space S by M2(x, y, z) := −2x/3, so, Greece too,
must import some Northern product, with value −2x/3 for each possible Northern consumption
x.
So, the payoff function of Greece is the linear function f2 of the space S into the real line R,
defined by
f2(x, y, z) = 2− y/3− 2x/3 + (1 + m)z2 + (1 + n)z1,
for every triple (x, y, z) in the strategic Cartesian space S.
We note that the function f2 depends significantly upon the strategies x in E, chosen by
SNC, and that f2 is again a linear function.
Assumption. We shall assume, for our specific study, the factors m and n non-negative
and equal respectively (only for sake of simplicity) to 1 and 1/2.
3.1.3 Payoff function of the game
We so have build up a coopetitive gain game with payoff function f : S → R2, given by
f(x, y, z) = (2 + x− y/3− z1 − z2/2, 2− y/3− 2x/3 + (1 + m)z2 + (1 + n)z1) =
= (2, 2) + (x− y/3,−2x/3− y/3) + z1(−1, 1 + n) + z2(−1/2, 1 + m),
for every (x, y, z) in S = [0, 3]2 × [0, 2]2.
4 Study of the game G = (f,>)
Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in (2U)2, the section-game G(z) = (p(z), >) - with
payoff function p(z) : E2 → R2 defined on the square E2 by p(z)(x, y) := f(x, y, z), for every
bi-strategy (x, y) - is the translation of the game G(0, 0) by the “cooperative” vector
v(z) = z1(−1, 1 + n) + z2(−1/2, 1 + m),
so that, we may study the initial game G(0, 0) and then we can translate the various informations
of the game G(0, 0), by the vectors v(z), to obtain the corresponding information for the game
G(z) (each game G(z) is isometric to the initial game G(0)).
4.1 Study of the initial game G0
So, let us consider the initial game G(0). The strategy square E2 of G(0) has vertices 02, 3e1, 32
and 3e2, where 02 is the origin of the Cartesian plane R2, e1 is the first canonical vector (1, 0),
32 is the vectors (3, 3) and e2 is the second canonical vector (0, 1).
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4.1.1 Topological Boundary of the payoff space of G0
In order to determine the the payoff space of the affine game G0 it suffices to transform the four
vertices of the strategy square (the game is an affine invertible game), because the critical zone
is empty.
4.1.2 Payoff space of the game G(0, 0).
So, the payoff space of the game G(0, 0) = (g,>), where the function g is the section f((·, ·), (0, 0))
is the parallelogram with vertices g(0, 0) = (2, 2), g(3, 0) = (5, 0), g(3, 3) = (4,−1) and f(0, 3) =
(1, 1). As we show in figure 1.
Figure 1: Initial payoff space of the game (f,<).
4.1.3 Nash equilibria.
The unique Nash equilibrium of the initial game is the bistrategy (3, 0). Indeed, the function g1
is linear and increasing with respect to the first argument; analogously, the function g2 is linear
and decreasing with respect to the second argument.
4.2 Study of the entire coopetitive game G = (f,>)
4.2.1 The payoff space of the coopetitive game G
The image of the payoff function f , is the union of the family of payoff spaces
(im(pz))z∈C = (pz(E × F ))z∈C ,
that is the convex envelope of the union of the initial payoff p0(E
2) and of its translation by
the vectors v(2, 0) and v(0, 2). The image of the coopetitive payoff function f , that is the payoff
space of the game, is the convex envelope of the points g(0, 0), g(3, 0), g(3, 3), g(0, 3) and of
their translations by v(2, 2), as we show in figure 2 (first step) and in figure 3 (second step).
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Figure 2: First dilation of the initial payoff space of the game (f,<).
Figure 3: Payoff space of the game (f,<), with m = 1, n = 1/2.
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4.2.2 Pareto maximal boundary of the payoff space of G
The Pareto sup-boundary of the coopetitive payoff space f(S) is the union of the segments
[A′′′, B′′′], [B′′′, (4, 4)] and [(4, 4), B′], see figure 3.
4.3 Possibility of global growth.
It is important to note that the absolute slopes of the segments [B′, (4, 4)], [(4, 4), B′′′], of the
Pareto (coopetitive) boundary, are strictly greater than 1. Thus the collective payoff f1 + f2 of
the game is not constant on the Pareto boundary and, therefore, the game implies the possibility
of a transferable utility global growth.
4.4 Trivial bargaining solutions.
The Nash bargaining solution on the entire payoff space, with respect to the infimum of the
Pareto boundary and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, with respect to the infimum
and the supremum of the Pareto boundary, are not acceptable for SNC: they are collectively
(i.e., from a Transferable Utility point of view) better than the Nash payoff of the initial game
G0 - both solutions belong to the Pareto segment [(4, 4), (2, 7)] - but they are disadvantageous for
SNC (they suffers a loss, with respect to (5, 0)): these solutions could be thought as rebalancing
solutions, but they are not realistically implementable.
4.5 Transferable utility solutions
In this coopetitive context it is more convenient to adopt a transferable utility solution, indeed:
• the point of maximum collective gain on the whole of the coopetitive payoff space is the
point B′′′ = (2, 7).
4.5.1 Rebalancing win-win solution relative to maximum gain for Greece in G.
Thus we propose a rebalancing win-win coopetitive solution relative to maximum gain for Greece
in G, as it follows (in the case m = 1):
• we consider the portion s, of transferable utility Pareto boundary M := (2, 7) + R(1,−1),
obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by convexifying) by the
straight lines Re1 and A′′′+Re1, these are the straight lines of Nash gain for Greece in the initial
game G(0) and of maximum gain for Greece in G, respectively.
• we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ with vertices (−1, 0) - infimum of the Pareto
boundary - and the supremum of the Pareto boundary.
• our best payoff rebalancing coopetitive compromise is the unique point K ′′′ in the inter-
section of segments s and s′.
Figure 4 shows:
• the above Transferable Utility (TU) Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K ′′′
• the TU Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K ′′ with respect to the Nash zone.
• the TU Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K ′ with respect to the Nash extreme point (4, 4).
• the TU Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K with respect to the initial Nash equilibrium (4, 4).
4.5.2 Win-win solution
The payoff TU Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions K represents a win-win solutions, with respect
to the initial Nash gain B′. So that, as we said, also SNC can increase its initial gain from
coopetition.
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Figure 4: Kalai win-win solutions of the game (f,<).
4.5.3 Win-win strategy procedure.
The win-win payoff K can be obtained in a properly transferable utility coopetitive fash-
ion, as it follows:
• 1) the two players agree on the cooperative strategy (2, 2) of the common set C;
• 2) the two players implement their respective Nash strategies in the game G(2, 2), so
competing a` la Nash; the unique Nash equilibrium of the game G(2, 2) is the bistrategy (3, 3);
• 3) finally, they share the “social pie” (f1 + f2)(3, 3, 2, 2), in a transferable utility coop-
erative fashion (by binding contract) according to the decomposition K.
5 Conclusions
In conclusion, we desire to stress that:
• the coopetitive game, provided in our contribution, is a normative model.
• our sample of coopetition has pointed out one win-win strategy, in a transferable utility
and properly coopetitive perspective, for Greece and SNC.
In the paper, we propose a framework characterized by a cooperative bi-strategy based on
two shared variables, export from Greece to SNC and FDI from SNC to Greece.
Thus, we provide:
• some properly coopetitive solutions (not convenient for SNC): Kalai-Smorodinsky bargain-
ing solution on the coopetitive Nash path, set of all possible Nash equilibria of the coopetitive
interaction.
• one transferable utility and properly coopetitive solution, convenient also for SNC and also
rebalancing for the Euro area.
• an extended Kalai-Smorodinsky method, appropriate to determine rebalancing partitions
on the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the coopetitive game.
The solutions offered by our coopetitive model:
• aim at “enlarging the pie and sharing it fairly”;
• show win-win and rebalancing outcomes, for the two countries, within a coopetitive game
path.
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• allow us to find “fair” amounts of Greek exports which SNC must cooperatively import as
well as the optimal FDI necessary to improve the Greek economy, contributing to growth and
to the stability of both the Greek and SNC economies.
Acknowledgments. Authors thank Dr. Alessia Donato for the preparation of the figures.
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